Ed Turner reflects on the recent state elections in Germany that saw the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) make significant gains and what the results mean for Chancellor Friedrich Merz, his government and Germany.
Minutes after polls closed in two state elections on Sunday, Germany’s Chancellor Friedrich Merz took to the podium in the HQ of his party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), and offered his own resumé of Germany’s various 2026 elections. In the good column was the party’s victory in Rhineland Palatinate back in March, and more recent local elections in Hesse and Lower Saxony. Set against this was the “worst defeat in many years” in Saxony-Anhalt two weeks ago, which saw the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) come close to an overall majority and in the frame to lead the first post-war far right state government.
Sunday’s contests, in Berlin (governed by the CDU – a position polls suggested it might defend) and Mecklenburg West Pomerania (a largely rural eastern state hosting a battle between the social democratic SPD and the AfD), had not gone the CDU’s way. Merz made a case for the government to press on with structural reforms, as “the antidote to the authoritarian poison which is penetrating ever more deeply into our society”. At that stage of the night, he was unaware that the CDU in Mecklenburg West Pomerania was about to fall below the 5% threshold needed for representation – a crass humiliation.
But as Olaf Scholz also experienced, elections in each of Germany’s sixteen states, spread throughout the four-year parliamentary term, can seriously destabilise a federal coalition government. Any party in the governing coalition which suffers defeat sees its MPs, regional leaders and members demand a stronger profile at the expense of coalition partners, fuelling disagreement within government. This is even more likely when coalitions are borne of electoral necessity rather than shared values. While arguably the centrist CDU of Angela Merkel was, in terms of day-to-day decision-making, a reasonable partner for the SPD, Merz’s far more socially conversative, economically liberal instincts do not make for a harmonious relationship. Merz and the SPD came together not out of mutual appreciation, but because there was no alternative capable of keeping the AfD away from power.
It is worth looking at some of the detail of the results in both states. In Berlin, where the Left Party won (with 25.7%, up 13.4 points), it surged to victory with remarkable vote-shares amongst younger voters – 43% amongst 16 to 24 year olds, and 49% amongst those aged 25 to 34. In Mecklenburg West Pomerania, where the AfD was narrowly ahead of the SPD but stands no chance of being in government, a plurality of younger voters supported the AfD (36% of 16 to 24 year olds, 32% of 25 to 34 year olds), though the SPD and the Left Party had combined vote shares of over 40% in the younger age groups. In Berlin, 29% of working-class voters supported the AfD, and in Mecklenburg West Pomerania 52% did – testifying to a big shift amongst this group to the far right.
In Mecklenburg West Pomerania, the SPD’s relative success, gaining much ground in the past two years, owed a huge amount to its popular Minister President, Manuela Schwesig, who ran a highly personalised campaign: 61% of voters were satisfied with her, and a majority satisfied with the state government – a substantial achievement given levels of political dissatisfaction nationally. Schwesig has been particularly critical of a key plank of the federal government’s proposed pensions reforms (amongst other policies she rejected), making it almost unthinkable that the SPD will sign off on these in the autumn, and she criticised Merz’ election-night statement for lacking “humility”. In other words – not only were significant vote-shares achieved by parties radically opposed to the status quo, but even the SPD’s leading candidate needed to position herself against some key government policies.
In Berlin, both the CDU and SPD had their local woes. The CDU’s Minister President stepped aside as a candidate in July after questions about his transparency in how he spent time during massive power cuts (a game of tennis he is likely forever to regret). The SPD went with a fresh face drafted in from Hanover, Steffen Krach, but just days before the election authorities searched his flat as part of an investigation into corrupt practices in his previous role. The most likely new coalition in Berlin is one between the Left Party, Greens and SPD, but, while in several other states the Left Party has been a measured, pragmatic governing party, in Berlin that is less likely. Several long-standing leading members resigned over its approach to anti-Semitism in its own ranks in 2024. So here, too, the result is a major challenge to mainstream politics.
Prior to these elections, it appeared Merz had bought some more time, after eight CDU Minister Presidents issued a statement expressing their support for “the Chancellor” (while not mentioning him by name – a quirk brilliantly discussed by journalist Robin Alexander in his podcast). In truth, nobody seriously expects Merz to be the party’s candidate for Chancellor in 2028, and his survival in the interim owes more to the lack of agreement upon a successor and a sense that Merz may be able to box through some difficult reforms, sparing any successor some difficult tasks.
September’s elections do much more than pose a challenge to Merz’s authority. Large parts of Germany’s political establishment support structural reforms as a way of rebooting the country’s flatlining economy, but such reforms provide easy fodder for opposition parties, especially those with a populist bent. The CDU will find itself stuck between its own MPs pushing for a rightward shift to challenge the AfD, and a coalition partner in the SPD which, on election night, even speculated about rowing back on reforms already agreed before the summer.
Government will continue to a drumbeat of dire opinion polls (with surveys showing dissatisfaction levels of over 85%). Global and economic challenges will remain, with no alternative government in sight. These election nights may have been focused on Berlin’s city hall and the state capitals of Magdeburg and Schwerin, but the ripples – and what they tell us about contemporary Germany – will cause real worries across Europe.
By Ed Turner, Reader in Politics at Aston University and Co-Director of the Aston Centre for Europe. He is acting chair of the International Association for the Study of German Politics.