On rule of law: Under the International Law Commission’s 2001 Articles on State Responsibility, a state that commits an internationally wrongful act owes full reparations, and injured states may take countermeasures to induce compliance. And in November 2022, the U.N. General Assembly recognized that Russia must bear the legal consequences of its aggression, including reparations.

The same articles also require countermeasures to be reversible, and Ukraine’s position honors that: The legal title stays in an EU-governed vehicle, Ukraine receives financing rather than ownership, and the arrangement unwinds the day Russia pays what it owes.

On the euro: This has already been tested. When the reserves were immobilized in February 2022, the euro’s share of global reserves did not move. Reserve holders understood then what they understand now — that this principle applies to a state waging a war of aggression in breach of the U.N. Charter, not to anyone else. Moreover, the euro’s credibility as a reserve currency rests on Europe’s ability to defend order and principles.

On leverage: These assets have been immobilized for more than four years and have not moved Moscow any closer to peace. A country budgeting €669 billion for a war of aggression is not bargaining for its reserves. What deters Russia is Ukraine’s capacity to keep fighting — and that is precisely what a European solution on these assets would fund. The leverage is not in holding the money, it is in spending it.

Finally, on seizing Western assets in Russia: Putin has been doing this since 2022. This September alone, Moscow took control of the Russian businesses of Nestlé, Auchan, Leroy Merlin, FM Logistic and Metro, following Danone and Carlsberg. That is why, as early as March 2022, we urged companies to leave. The confiscation of European property has already happened — and keeping the assets immobilized did not deter this.

Let us be clear about what we are not proposing. We are not proposing outright confiscation — the legal title will not transfer. We are not proposing a Belgian decision — the risk will be shared at the EU level. And we are not proposing a precedent for anyone else. The conditions — a war of aggression condemned by the U.N. General Assembly — are met by only one state.