David Gauke is a former Justice Secretary and was an independent candidate in South-West Hertfordshire at the 2019 general election.

It was a dramatic electoral collapse.  A party that had expanded its electoral coalition under charismatic – if controversial – leadership, that appeared electorally dominant as its opponents lost touch with its traditional supporters, suffered a massive defeat unparalleled in modern times.  Not only were the recent electoral advances reversed, but defeats were suffered in previously safe areas.

A political party that was once seen as trusted on the economy and in tune with public opinion on cultural matters was blamed for presiding over a cost of living crisis and being insufficiently focused on the priorities of ordinary people. Rather than standing up to the elite, voters thought they were more interested in enjoying and exploiting the privileges of office.

And how the voters took their revenge.  On 4 July 2024, the Conservative Party lost 251 of its 372 seats, delivering the worst result in its history.

This, of course, was not the last time a right of centre political party, having pursued a populist turn, came a cropper with the electorate.  Last week’s midterms were also truly spectacular, leaving the Democrats with a large majority in both the Senate and the House of Representatives.  As with the UK in 2024, constituencies which were thought beyond the reach of political opponents and had received little national attention were flipped.  Texas, Kansas and Mississippi all elected Democrat senators; Louisiana and Florida very nearly did so.

It was an extraordinary repudiation of Donald Trump.  It was also, I will argue, a repudiation of populism. But before making that argument, it is worth acknowledging a couple of caveats.

The first qualification is that what really hurt the Republicans in 2026, just as what really hurt the Tories in 2024, were struggling living standards.  However much many of us loath Trump’s crudeness and vulgarity, his contempt for ethical standards, his ignorance on trade policy, and his sympathies for dictators in general and Vladimir Putin in particular, none of this would have been of great electoral significance if the American public felt substantially better off than they did when he was elected.

The second qualification is that if we accept that the cause of the GOP implosion was essentially economic, one can also make the argument that the cause was not an administration that was too MAGA but not MAGA enough.  If part of the core offer of Trump was no more expensive foreign wars (and that is the argument that Trump made for many years), one can argue that the failure to stick to that promise by bombing Iran has undermined the entire project.  That is the case that Vice President JD Vance is making in an attempt distance himself from the President while establishing his leadership of the MAGA movement.

There is some truth to this.  The Iranian conflict has been a costly error that has directly impacted the living standards of American citizens, not least in agricultural states like Kansas and Iowa where diesel costs are keenly felt.  American voters punished Trump’s party accordingly.

If one wanted to argue that the midterm defeat was not a rejection of populism in general and MAGA in particular, there is a plausible case to be made that the results were a rejection of a party that presided over a squeeze in living standards and that the cause of that squeeze was a policy that was at odds with one of the fundamental tenets of MAGA, which is to put America First.

Having said all that, there were plenty of core MAGA policies that contributed to Tuesday’s results.  Higher energy costs have contributed to higher prices in the US, but so have Trump’s tariffs.  Contrary to his earlier claims, such tariffs are not paid by foreign countries but by US consumers.  Putting up trade barriers, it turns out, does nothing to improve living standards.

Then there is immigration policy.  This has long been seen as an area of political strength for Trump as he tightened the southern border.  But a tight immigration policy does come with economic downsides – at least in the short term – if it reduces the size of the labour market.  In these elections, however, the biggest impact has been that heavy-handed actions by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) that has alienated Latino voters, resulting in huge swings away from the Republicans in Texas and Florida.

This was not the only ethnic minority who were motivated to vote against the Republicans. Turnout from black voters in southern states was notably higher than in 2022, in part because of the weakening of the Voting Rights Act.

There is, however, something more fundamental about the vulnerability to populists in office seeing their voting support collapse, which brings us back to the parallels with the Conservatives. The basic message of populists is a simple one, which is why it can be so effective.  Populists tell the public that all their problems are a consequence of an out-of-touch, unaccountable elite.  We, however, are on your side and we will deliver for you.  It is a message that particularly appeals to the angriest and most impatient parts of the electorate.

This leads to setting expectations very high.  When those expectations are not met – as was the experience of the Conservatives after 2019 and the Republicans today, it is no surprise that their support bases – inclined towards anger and impatience – turned against them.  (Incidentally, there is a warning here for the Democrats in that voters disillusioned with one party can quickly become disillusioned with another, as happened with Keir Starmer and Labour.)

There is a further problem with populism that leaves it vulnerable.  The skill-set for being a successful campaigner as a populist is very different to that of delivering effective government.  Populism is all about simplifying, delivering clear messages that appeal to people’s emotions.  To do this well and authentically, it helps if the communicator is untroubled by the complexity of a situation.  This makes Trump and much more effective populist than, say, Vance. Johnson is vastly more intelligent Trump, but had the ability to dismiss complexity if it was to his advantage.

When running a country, however, these are not great qualities. One has to understand detail and weigh trade-offs.  If Trump had bothered to read a briefing note that explained how the Strait of Hormuz could be blocked by the Iranians, we would all be paying much less for energy.

And then there are the ethical standards.  To be a populist requires a willingness to jettison scruples because it requires a willingness to simplify arguments to the point of being misleading, and to exploit the ignorance and prejudices of those less well-informed.  If willing to act in this way, it is not hard to believe that wider impropriety will also be an issue.

Corruption was evidently a major concern for American voters last week.  The controversy about parties in Downing Street pales into insignificance compared to the allegations of personal enrichment that circle around the Trump administration, but the appearance that those in office were above the law cut through to voters in both cases.

The overall lesson is clear.  If your political platform involves policies that harm the economy, your leaders are ill-equipped to govern well, and your ethical standards are dubious, the public will – when the economic climate is against you – turn on your party and punish you severely.

Ultimately, both the 2024 defeat for the Conservatives and the 2026 defeat for the Republicans showed that while embracing populism can win you power, once in power it leaves parties of the centre-right vulnerable to catastrophic defeats.