The prospect of another hung parliament is higher than it has been for years. For Liberal Democrats that raises a familiar question: how do we maximise our influence without repeating the electoral damage of 2010–15?

Full coalition is one answer. It is not the only one. I want to set out a competing model: the Reserved Time Confidence Agreement.

How it works

Under a Reserved Time Confidence Agreement a larger party forms a single-party government. A smaller party (or parties) agrees to support that government on all confidence motions and on supply. In return it receives two things:

1. Thirty reserved legislative days each session.

On these days the supporting party controls the agenda. Both parties in the agreement are explicitly free to seek votes from any other party in the House in order to pass measures that stick as closely as possible to their own manifestos. The supporting party may therefore build majorities with the official opposition or with other parties on issues where the senior partner is unwilling to move. Equally, the senior partner may use its own time, or seek support from others, to advance its priorities. If the two parties are closer to each other than to anyone else, they will often find it easiest to use the reserved days for joint business. The point of the rule is to maximise each party’s ability to deliver what it promised voters, rather than forcing a lowest-common-denominator programme.

2. A mutual veto on early elections.

After each general election the House elects two “election callers” by open ballot. Joint tickets are proposed by the Speaker on the advice of the parties. If no ticket secures a majority after five attempts, the positions default to the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition. An early dissolution requires the agreement of both. In a majority government this is effectively the Prime Minister plus a colleague. In a hung parliament it is normally the two party leaders who are keeping the government in office. Neither can force an election on the other.

The supporting party takes no ministerial posts and is not bound by collective responsibility.

Why this is different from coalition

A coalition trades ministerial jobs and a joint programme for full public ownership of the government’s record. The Reserved Time Confidence Agreement trades a narrower set of institutional concessions—protected Commons time and a mutual election veto—for confidence support without integration.
The larger party keeps sole control of the executive and most of the legislative agenda. The smaller party keeps a clear public distinction from the government and a structural route to pursue its own priorities. Both sides know in advance what they are getting and what they are giving up.

Advantages for Liberal Democrats

The central risk of coalition is absorption. Voters struggle to separate the junior partner from the senior one, and the electoral consequences can be severe. A Reserved Time Confidence Agreement is designed to reduce that risk:

• No ministers means no collective responsibility and a clearer line between “supporting the government on confidence” and “being the government.”
• Thirty reserved days, with the explicit right for both parties to seek votes from anyone else, give each party a regular opportunity to advance manifesto commitments even when the other is opposed.
• The election-callers remove the senior partner’s ability to call a snap election at the moment of maximum disadvantage to the Liberal Democrats.
• The party can stay closer to the platform it was elected on, because it is not required to defend every decision taken inside government.

These features also matter to any larger party that needs reliable confidence support but cannot easily win the seats Liberal Democrats hold. An arrangement that keeps the Liberal Democrats electorally viable is more useful to Labour (or any other partner) than one that risks reducing us to a handful of MPs.

The election-callers would require primary legislation and could become a permanent feature of the constitution. The thirty reserved days would be secured through Standing Orders and renegotiated after each election, like any confidence-and-supply deal. Both are achievable if the political will exists after the votes are counted.
No model is cost-free. Thirty days plus an election veto is a real price for the senior party. It is simply a different price from the one demanded by coalition. The existence of a worked-out alternative expands the range of stable governments that can be formed when no party has a majority, and gives Liberal Democrats a clearer way to exercise influence without sacrificing the distinct identity that our voters expect.

The Reserved Time Confidence Agreement is not a rejection of cooperation. It is a competing model to coalition—one that prioritises legislative power, electoral survival, and accountability to our own manifesto over executive office. It deserves serious consideration the next time the numbers leave us with a choice.

* Owen Driscoll is a member of Epping and Harlow Liberal Democrats.